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Abstract—With near exponential growth predicted in the num-
ber of Internet of Things (IoT) based devices within networked
systems there is need of a means of providing their flexible
and secure integration. Software Defined Networking (SDN) is a
concept that allows for the centralised control and configuration
of network devices, and also provides opportunities for the
dynamic control of network traffic. This paper proposes the use of
an SDN gateway as a distributed means of monitoring the traffic
originating from and directed to IoT based devices. This gateway
can then both detect anomalous behaviour and perform an
appropriate response (blocking, forwarding, or applying Quality
of Service). Initial results demonstrate that, while the addition of
the attack detection functionality has an impact on the number
of flow installations possible per second, it can successfully detect
and block TCP and ICMP flood based attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of Internet of Things (IoT) based devices
brings with it additional considerations with regards to secur-
ing the network. For the number of IoT devices in use to
reach the number (e.g. 24 billion by 2020 [1]) and ubiquity
within society predicted, there will need to be a flexible
method of integrating these devices within overall network
architectures. This integration will potentially be dynamic, as
users and devices leave and join the networks within their
range (e.g. a person with body area network sensors that
connect to local networks). This brings challenges with regards
to ensuring the secure configuration and integration of devices
to the network. Experimental exploitation of current smart
devices (e.g. Phillips Hue light bulbs, Nest thermostat) [2] has
demonstrated the need for a better approach to handling IoT
security. Current approaches of firewall zoning and IDS/IPS
are too constrained by a traditional network architecture and
are potentially computationally heavy when considering the
increase in network devices.
Software Defined Networking proposes a fundamental re-
design of how networks are architected, with a view to
increasing flexibility and aiding device management. This is
achieved through the separation of control and data planes,
and the introduction of a centralised (though potentially
distributed) controller. The potential use of an SDN based
switch as a gateway for IoT devices provides opportunities
for packet inspection, and traffic pattern analysis at the local
(i.e. distributed) or global (i.e. centralised) level. This paper
proposes a new adaptive flow based security mechanism for
IoT devices using an SDN gateway. This adaptive mechanism
will perform dynamic analysis of traffic patterns from IoT
devices to determine when devices are acting in a malicious
manner, or are being the target of external exploitation.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section
II explores the background of IoT device security, focusing
on current mechanisms and future requirements. Section III
discusses the area of Software Defined Networking and its
use in IoT Gateways. This includes their use in determining
anomalous behaviour through traffic analysis. Section IV intro-
duces the proposed mechanism and discusses its place within
the wider network architecture. Section V presents initial
proof of concept implementation work and experimentation
results. VI concludes and discusses areas for potential future
directions.
II. BACKGROUND
This section provides an overview of current approaches
to IoT infrastructure security, focusing on the unique charac-
teristics of IoT devices that mean traditional approaches to
network security may not be possible. The section concludes
with consideration of security within the IoT based network
itself.
A. IoT Device Security
IoT based devices are fundamentally based around the
principles of wireless networks [3], which brings with it a
wide variety of security issues. Firstly, nodes authentication
is critical to ensure data privacy and prevention of illegal
access to IoT devices. Implementation of authentication re-
quires application signature-based identification and access
confirmation mechanism or centralised server that authorises
requested access.
Due to wireless data transmission, network traffic, trans-
ferred between nodes must be encrypted to protect the con-
fidentiality of information. Securing this data requires opti-
mal cryptography algorithms and adequate key-management
systems. In this case, key-management includes secret key
generation, storage, distribution and updating, where according
to [4], distribution of public and secret keys to legitimate users
is a key issue.
The majority of proposed security solutions use crypto-
graphic algorithms, that normally require high amount of
resources. Considering that most IoT devices are associ-
ated with low energy and computing resources capabilities,
such solutions cannot be implemented to IoT devices with
an application of traditional cryptographic mechanisms [5].
Implementing encryption algorithms that are optimised for
low power devices is a well established area of work, with
examples including; [6] experimental evaluation of different
types of Attribute-Based Encryption algorithms to analyse
applicability and efficiency, and [7] public key encryption
algorithm optimisation for the use in resource constrained
wireless sensor networks.
B. IoT Network Security
Data privacy is one of the most critical qualities in an IoT
infrastructure due to potentially high amounts of sensitive data
transferred (giving current context/status of people, device,
or objects, for example). Trust management is a significant
part of achieving IoT node privacy. Trust management can
be insured by strong authentication mechanisms implemented
on the node and by separation and globally managed network
access control [8].
According to [9], access control in such a dynamic environ-
ment as an IoT infrastructure requires a centralised controller
that will manage traffic flows and exclude unauthorised access
to IoT nodes through the network infrastructure. Integration of
network access control allows the simplification of authentica-
tion mechanisms on endpoint nodes to save computation time
and therefore power.
Another critical issue is the securing of network level rout-
ing in wireless sensor network. Attacks toward routing infras-
tructure can cause the unavailability of network components,
and data loss [10]. While limitations of energy and computing
resources make traditional routing protocols inefficient for
an IoT infrastructure, routing protocols, adapted for Wireless
Sensor Networks are required.
As [4] discuss, Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks
are currently the most common network attacks, and especially
in the IoT. Centralised data collectors and IoT gateways
becomes a single point of failure for a group of sensors of other
IoT devices. That makes infrastructure critically vulnerable for
DDoS attacks. Similarly, separate devices not aggregated to
groups are also vulnerable to DDoS attacks due to limited
resources.
C. Summary
Computation and power constraints common within IoT
devices mean that many traditional approaches to network
security are not practical. While work in the separate areas
discussed within this section goes part, or most of the way
to addressing these limitations, there is scope to further
explore the potential advantages that a centralised gateway
(as is required for many IoT devices to access a standard IP
network).
III. SDN BASED IOT GATEWAYS
This section briefly introduces the are of Software Defined
Networking (SDN) and discusses its applicability to both
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Introducing Software-Defined Networking 
Software Defined Networking (SDN) is an emerging network architecture 
where network control is decoupled from forwarding and is directly 
programmable. This migration of control, formerly tightly bound in individual 
network devices, into accessible computing devices enables the underlying 
infrastructure to be abstracted for applications and network services, which 
can treat the network as a logical or virtual entity. 
Figure 1 depicts a logical view of the SDN architecture. Network intelligence 
is (logically) centralized in software-based SDN controllers, which maintain 
a global view of the network. As a result, the network appears to the 
applications and policy engines as a single, logical switch. With SDN, 
enterprises and carriers gain vendor-independent control over the entire 
network from a single logical point, which greatly simplifies the network 
design and operation. SDN also greatly simplifies the network devices 
themselves, since they no longer need to understand and process 
thousands of protocol standards but merely accept instructions from the 
SDN controllers.
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Perhaps most importantly, network operators and administrators can 
programmatically configure this simplified network abstraction rather than 
having to hand-code tens of thousands of lines of configuration scattered 
among thousands of devices. In addition, leveraging the SDN controller’s 
centralized intelligence, IT can alter network behavior in real-time and 
deploy new applications and network services in a matter of hours or days, 
FIGURE 1 
Software-Defined Network 
Architecture
Fig. 1. Software-Defined Network Architecture [12]
actin as a gateway for oT devic s and acting as a security
mechanism in itself.
A. SDN Background
When configuring traditional network devices (e.g.
switches, or routers) the low level details of configuration and
features etc. (referred to as the control plane) are dependent
on the proprietary operating system of that device. This
means that networks can be difficult to reconfigure in a
dynamic manner, and complex to manage. Software Defined
Networking (SDN), as discussed in [11], aims to address this
through the decoupling of control and data planes to allow
for the software based configuration of devices, as illustrated
in Figure 1. The high level architectural overview of SDN,
provided by [12], goes on to detail how it consists of three
main principles:
• Decoupling of controller and data planes
• Logically centralised control
• Exposure of abstract network resources and state to
external applications
These principles work together to facilitate the control and
configuration of the network through a software based element,
thus allowing all the associated advantages (such as dynamic
control). A logically centralised controller provides a means of
monitoring the overall network performance and dynamically
adjusting configuration (be it re-routing traffic, or applying a
new bandwidth rate limit to a greedy flow, etc.).
B. SDN-Based Security Research Projects
SDN itself does bring with it new challenges in terms
of security, with the potential vulnerabilities inherent in
centralised control, that require further research. There are,
however, a number of new areas in which the dynamic and
centralised functionality provided by SDN can enable new
network security mechanisms. Ongoing projects in the area of
SDN based security architectures demonstrate how the global
network view and centralised control provided by SDN can be
applied to enhance the efficiency of IoT security mechanisms
and mitigate part of the most critical threats.
A centralised network controller allows the management and
control of every traffic flow from the entire network, and can
be used for development of flexible access control systems.
[13] suggest a SDN-based network control approach where
traffic flows are permitted or blocked based on security levels
of the source and destination. Following a similar theme, [14]
propose a network architecture with required validation of
the address for every source of data. In this, source address
validation is performed by the network controller in reactive
mode for every packet that is sent to the controller. This places
a potentially high computational load on the controller and
may result in scalability issues, however, this could potentially
be addressed through distribution of control.
One of the most common and significant security threats
deeply researched is that of Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS) attacks. A number of projects are currently seeking to
use SDN based security systems as means of mitigating such
attacks. For example:
• [15] suggest a network architecture with application
identification for every new traffic flow. DDoS defence
is performed by limitation of flow amount for the same
application per data source.
• [16] propose DDoS attack detection mechanism based on
the network traffic statistic analysis. Controller analyse
amount of transferred traffic and frequency of specific
event which are associated with DoS attack.
• [17] developed a data traffic analysis method based on
self-organising maps that detects malicious traffic flows.
• [18] developed flow count detection method based for
anomaly detection based on analysis of previous network
behaviour and comparison with current state. This meth-
ods allows the detection of abnormal traffic flow, that are
associated with DDoS attacks.
Currently significant effort is made in the area of wireless
network security enhancement by implementation of SDN
architecture:
• The OpenRoads project [19] (available under open source
licence) decouples the network mobility services from the
underlying physical infrastructure. doing so it allows the
management and control of the network dynamically by
several sources.
• Odin [20] is an enterprise SDN based system, that uses
an abstraction of light virtual access points to virtualise
network infrastructure. It allows to build layered network
with simple configuration and network management.
• OpenAPI [21] develops a wireless network architecture
aimed at service quality and security management in ISP
networks, achieved by virtualisation of last-mile access
infrastructure.
C. SDN-Based Security Applications
In addition to the ongoing SDN-based security research
projects, there are a small number of commercially developed
security applications that are designed to integrate with SDN
controllers.
1) Radware DefenseFlow: Radware [22] is a member of the
Opendaylight project and have created DefenseFlow, an SDN-
based DDoS mitigation hardware/software package, which
allows all appliances within the network to become part of
the DDoS mitigation process. DefenseFlow performs two main
tasks: monitoring behaviour of protected traffic and forwarding
attacked traffic to mitigation & scrubbing centres.First, Pro-
tected objects within the network are specified, these may be
servers, devices or subnetworks. Once the protected objects are
defined, DefenseFlow determines the appropriate places within
the network to dynamically deploy traffic counters relating to
the protected object.
The counters are monitored over a period of time and
are used to determine network operation baselines. When
a counter experiences a behavioural anomaly, an attack is
declared against that particular protocol and mitigation pro-
cedures commence. A QoS policy is configured, limiting the
rates of the traffic under attack and the offending traffic
flows can be dropped or diverted to Out-of-Path filtering and
scrubbing tools. Any legitimate packets are filtered out and
placed back into the network. SDN mechanisms, such as flow
tables and counters, allow granular control of traffic flows
allowing only suspicious traffic flows to be diverted to the
scrubbing centre. This represents an improvement over similar
statistical based systems which, after an attack is declared, re-
direct all traffic towards the scrubbing centre.
2) Brocade: Brocade offer a similar solution to Defense-
Flow, called Real-Time SDN and NFV Analytics for DDoS
Mitigation. Its main difference is the use of SFlow for cap-
turing flow counters instead of Netflow. Whereas Netflow
monitors all traffic flows and places a substantial load on
the CPU, sFlow uses packet sampling to create accurate flow
statistics. According to [23] sFlow statistics are leveraged to
identify long lived large flows (those flows with a duration of
tens of seconds), and using approximately 10% of the available
bandwidth. Whilst other flow types can be used to execute a
DDoS attack, they do not pose the kind of immediate threat as
a long lived large flow. Upon flood attack detection, mitigation
actions take place and OpenFlow rules are pushed from the
controller to the switches.
D. Summary
This section has considered a number of projects relating
to the use of SDN as a means of securing the network from
attack. The DefenseFlow and Brocade models are nominally
very similar in operation, and both currently require propri-
ety hardware or software to fully implement, which limits
the practicality of their widespread deployment as means of
securing IoT gateways.
Research projects, such as [18] provide solutions that are
potentially computationally simple enough to run within small-
scale gateway devices. The lack of consideration for wider
traffic flow characteristics and the need to distribute control,
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Fig. 2. IoT Software-Defined Network Architecture
however, means that they are not readily applicable to IoT
based systems.
IV. PROPOSED FLOW BASED SECURITY MECHANISM
The author’s previous work [24] demonstrated the potential
for using simple flow analysis to determine whether flows are
periodic, and if so, to pre-emptively install their corresponding
rule into the flow table prior to a packets arrival at a switch. It
can be seen that a similar approach can be taken in analysing
the traffic coming from and going to IoT devices through
an SDN gateway to determine where traffic patterns either
fall outside of expected (potentially historically derived, or
manually specified) patterns or match known patterns used to
exploit these devices.
The use of traffic analysis as a means of protecting the
network is not unique in itself, however, the use of an SDN
gateway and controller allows for a holistic view of the net-
work and removes the need for additional dedicated hardware.
It is proposed here to use the IoT gateway as both an SDN
switch and integrated controller to allow for analysis of traffic
patterns and their corresponding flow rules closer to the edge
of the network. This functionality would focus on the security
provisioning, with wider network functions (such as routing,
QoS, etc.) facilitated by centralised (though still potentially
distributed) control. Figure 2 provides an illustration of the
proposed system architecture.
Moving functionality back to the network edge may seem
contrary to the initial concept of SDN devices with centralised
control, however it is necessary here in order to meet the
performance requirements, and also to inherently move the
point of security closer to the IoT devices themselves. This is
particularly important for an SDN network where OpenFlow
messages are transferred to the controller, and therefore DoS
based attacks can propagate their effects through the network.
Placing devices at the network edge lowers their potential
load, and therefore means that smaller-scale devices may
potentially be used. Project such as [25] demonstrate that even
low powered devices, such as the Raspberry Pi used here,
can act as an SDN switch. This largely removes cost as a
barrier, where the performance of the device can be proven to
be sufficient for the system in development.
V. PROOF OF CONCEPT IMPLEMENTATION AND INITIAL
EXPERIMENTATION
Initial Implementation focused on providing a proof-of-
concept for the use of an SDN controller to perform the
necessary attack detection and mitigation. This was developed
using version 1.3 of the OpenFlow protocol and the Pox
controller.
The implemented controller consists of three main compo-
nents; the main switch functionality (forwarding, etc.), a statis-
tics manager, and a set of mitigation actions. For the purposes
of this proof of concept, the Pox L2 learning switch module
was used as a base around which additional functionality was
written.
The statistics manager is necessary for gathering data with
regards to the current and historic data rates and characteristics
of flows. For this implementation, this was limited to data
throughput rate and interval of transmission. Future expansions
could, however, utilise a more context based approach to
traffic analysis (e.g. considering time/day, and correlating data
transmission from other devices).
Upon detection of an anomalous flow, the proposed mech-
anism executes an appropriate mitigation action (as shown in
Figure 3). The three possible actions are; Block, Forward, or
Apply QoS.
• Blocking a flow effectively blacklists that device from
transmitting or receiving data across the network. If this
were a device that was under attack from an external
source, then it would be prudent to block access to
the device for the source of attack (based on source IP
address) and to update the central controller to attempt
to block this traffic closer to the source (be it internal
or external). If the device itself has been compromised
then traffic can be blocked and the device reported to
a management system to be investigated (to check for
physical compromise, or software update required, etc.).
• Forwarding a flow to a quarantined part of the network
could allow for deeper inspection of the traffic before
reaching a decision about how to treat a device.
• Where a decision is not clear, or blocking a single source
not possible, applying Quality of Service to limit the
impact of any attack (e.g. by limiting the bandwidth rate
at which data can flow to/from a device) can provide a
means of limiting the effect of an attack.
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Fig. 3. Mitigate Action
The choice between mitigation actions is, at this stage,
a design-time decision. This could, however, be built-up in
a more dynamic manner as new threats are discovered and
assessed based on the responses to similar attacks.
A. Experimental Topology
For the purposes of experimentation a simple topology
was developed, consisting of an IoT device source, a sync
destination, and an attacking node, using an SDN based
gateway with associated controller as the intermediary device
(illustrated in Figure 4). Mininet was used as a means of
emulating nodes and SDN devices, while Pox was used as the
controller, running the custom developed controller including
the proposed security mechanism.
Experimentation focused on the use of TCP flood and ICMP
based attacks, using the Low Orbit Ion Cannon tool [26],
confirming the ability of the SDN based security mechanism
to block and mitigate these attacks. To show the affect of
this attack on genuine traffic from the device a TCP stream
of 1.5Mb/s was generated from the IoT device to a sync
destination. The link itself was configured with a maximum
bandwidth of 1.5Mbps to simulate resource constrained links.
Note that, while in reality data rates from IoT based devices
may be lower, the intention here is to show the effect of the
attack on the genuine traffic.
B. Initial Results
Scenario 1 investigated the use of A TCP Flood attack from
the attacker to the IoT Device. The genuine traffic was sent
using TCP at approximately 1.5Mbps (the capacity of the link).
The Low Orbit Ion Cannon tool was used to send 2Mbits per
second of traffic, thus saturating the link. Figure 5 shows the
results of this attack. At 5 seconds, the attack was started
IoT Device
Attack Source
SDN Gateway
Controller
IoT Sync Destination
Fig. 4. Experiment Topology
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Fig. 5. TCP Flood Experimentation Results
and at approximately 10 seconds, the attack is mitigated by
blocking this flow. The genuine traffic flow then recovers and
continues its optimal transfer rate.
Scenario 2 follows a similar pattern, whereby a genuine TCP
flow transmits at approximately 1.5Mbps and at 5 seconds an
ICMP based attack is started on the IoT Device (Figure 6).
This can be seen to have a detrimental effect on the genuine
traffic stream, until at approximately 9 seconds the attack is
successfully blocked, and the TCP stream begins to recover.
Figure 7 shows the effect on controller performance (mea-
sured in terms of flow installations per second) of the addi-
tional functionality implemented for this mechanism. The L2
learning switch gave an average of 5.2 flow installations per
second, while the proof of concept implementation resulted in
an average of 2.6 flow installations per second. This is a clear
difference and a potential consideration when implementing
such mechanisms. The distributed nature of the approach
described within this paper, however, means that the number
of devices connected to each gateway/controller should be
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relatively low, so the lower number of flow installations per
second should not be prohibitive.
VI. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
This paper has provided an overview of the need for a
flexible and dynamic method of IoT security, and has discussed
the potential for an SDN based gateway to address this issue. A
flexible flow based security mechanism for IoT based devices
has been proposed and developed using the Pox controller.
While the initial test results only cover the blocking of a
small number of attacks, it has both successfully validated
the approach and provided a platform upon which future
expansions can be developed.
Future work will focus on two main directions. Firstly, the
expansion of the current implementation, and hardware based
test-bed development. Secondly the dynamic traffic analysis
tools component shall be abstract as a means of providing
this as a service to other network applications running on top
of SDN controllers.
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